The fragile negotiations between Israel and Hamas have once again entered a decisive phase, marked by the unveiling of a new ceasefire-hostage release proposal brokered by Egypt and Qatar. This proposal, which Hamas has reportedly accepted, includes notable shifts in its previous demands. Yet the core dilemma confronting the Israeli leadership remains unchanged: whether to accept a partial agreement that could save lives in the short term but risks undermining its broader strategic aims.
According to multiple sources, Hamas has moderated two of its key positions that previously stalled talks. It is now seeking the release of 140 prisoners serving life sentences instead of 200, and has agreed to a slightly wider Israeli buffer zone along Gaza’s border. The television channel Al-Mayadeen reports additional concessions: a 1,000-metre IDF withdrawal in most of northern and eastern Gaza (excluding Shuja’iyya and Beit Lahia), the release of ten living hostages in exchange for 140 life-term prisoners and 60 others serving long sentences, as well as the release of all female and minor prisoners. It is also demanding a change in IDF deployment maps and substantial humanitarian aid, to be delivered by the UN and Red Crescent.
Israel must ask not only if Hamas is willing to make a deal, but whether it is capable of enforcing one
While these adjustments suggest a degree of flexibility, the broader picture points to a different calculus. According to Arab and Israeli sources, Hamas’s sudden willingness to compromise follows intensifying military pressure and credible threats of an Israeli ground offensive into Gaza City. As Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich noted:
Hamas is under great pressure due to the conquest of Gaza because it understands that this will eliminate it and end the story. Therefore, it is trying to stop it by bringing back the partial deal.
This observation aligns with a pattern long evident: concessions from Hamas arise not from diplomacy but from duress. The paradox of Western recognition initiatives for a Palestinian state is that they often relieve pressure at precisely the moment it must be maintained. When Britain, Australia, Canada and others rushed to endorse Palestinian statehood in the wake of stagnated negotiations, they unintentionally signalled to Hamas that maximalist demands could be rewarded without compromise. Only when the IDF renewed its offensive posture, preparing for a move on Gaza City, did Hamas inch toward realism.
Israel now faces a high-stakes decision. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, following a visit to the Gaza Division, later addressed the nation, lauding the IDF’s achievements and affirming the military’s commitment to defeating Hamas and freeing all hostages. He spoke of the ‘fighting spirit’ of the troops and claimed that ‘Hamas is under atomic pressure’. And yet, behind the rhetoric lies ambiguity. A senior political source maintains that Israel’s official position demands the release of all hostages and the fulfilment of previously defined conditions. However, Netanyahu’s own remarks do not explicitly rule out a partial agreement, and political observers note that if a deal approximating the ‘Witkoff formula’ emerges, it will be politically difficult to reject.
Domestically, the prime minister’s manoeuvring space is enhanced by the Knesset recess, which suspends immediate parliamentary scrutiny. Among the families of the hostages, there is no single voice. The Tikva Forum, known for its more hardline and pro-government stance, has denounced any partial deal as a ‘disgrace’, accusing Hamas of mockery and Netanyahu of fearfulness. But many other hostage families – those more prominently represented in public discourse – have expressed support for a deal that could return their loved ones alive, even at great cost. Their anguish is genuine, their moral authority undeniable. Yet the government must consider a broader matrix of responsibilities: to hostages, yes, but also to future victims should Hamas be allowed to regroup.
At issue is not only the number of hostages returned, but the legitimacy of the war’s strategic aims. If Israel accepts a deal that leaves Hamas’s core leadership intact and its military capability partially restored, it may achieve tactical relief at the cost of long-term security. Worse, it may reward the very behaviour it seeks to deter.
There is also a perceptible gap between Palestinian negotiators and their own fighters. At various times, there have been signs that commitments made by Hamas delegates in Doha or Cairo are not always clearly aligned with the actions of combat units within Gaza. The grotesque propaganda spectacles staged by Hamas during previous hostage releases underscored its disdain for international norms and the suffering of those involved. In one instance, the group returned an incorrect body; in another, it attempted to substitute agreed hostages with others not included in the talks.
Such conduct reveals not only a breakdown in internal coordination, but a willingness to degrade and mock the very process to which it nominally consents. This structural ambiguity within Hamas complicates any agreement’s enforceability. Israel must therefore ask not only whether Hamas is willing to make a deal, but whether it is capable of enforcing one.
The current moment is shaped by a collision of imperatives. The moral imperative to save lives. The strategic imperative to dismantle a genocidal militia. The political imperative to maintain domestic unity. And the diplomatic imperative to navigate global scrutiny. A partial deal may deliver immediate humanitarian relief and limited hostage returns, but it risks preserving Hamas as a political actor and inviting future bloodshed.
