One of the key takeaways of Donald Trump’s return to the White House is the eclectic and unprecedented coalition he has pulled together to engineer one of the greatest political comebacks in history.

Winning over a majority of Americans is dependent on candidates forming broad electoral coalitions. Richard Nixon’s win in 1968 and landslide in 1972 came from a ‘silent majority’ comprised of war veterans, white, blue-collar workers not actively participating in politics, and suburban and rural voters who believed in law and order and resisted the vocal progressive minority engaging in constant protest.

Ronald Reagan’s two landslide wins in 1980 and 1984 comprised social conservatives, pro-business free market thinkers, anti-communist ‘neo-conservatives’ (previously aligned with the Democrats) as well as ‘Reagan Democrats’ – working class, often union members, who voted Democrat but lent their support to Reagan and to his successor George H.W. Bush in 1988.

Working class voters drifted away but George W. Bush won narrow elections in 2000 and 2004 off the back of big business, social conservatives, and (in 2004) support for the war on terror. But the Reagan majority was fading.

Ruy Teixeira and John Judis wrote an important (and highly promoted) analysis, The Emerging Democratic Majority. The book argued that certain demographic changes, such as rising numbers of college educated ‘professionals’, declining marriage rates, the rise of voters working in services, and the decline of the working class, would all serve to provide the Democratic party with an effective lock on future elections.

Donald Trump briefly corralled together a new coalition by shedding the neo-conservatives and adding in working class and low-income Americans, particularly in the hollowed-out towns of the post-industrial Midwest who had been torn apart, first by uninterested policymakers shipping their jobs and factories overseas, and second by an epidemic of opioids. Many of these voters had never voted or had stopped voting after seeing how their support was not reciprocated by those in power.

The Trump coalition in 2024 retains the traditional Republican constituencies of rural voters, married suburban voters, small businesses, and veterans. It re-engaged with workers and union households, as demonstrated by the head of the traditionally Democrat-aligned Teamsters Union explicitly backing Trump and the wider union movement refusing to endorse either candidate for the first time since 1996.

Trump’s coalition is now more firmly sceptical of corporatism and foreign wars in the style of Pat Buchanan’s paleoconservatism. It also folds in anti-war Democrats, such as former Democrat presidential candidate Tulsi Gabbard who formally joined the Republican party and Trump’s campaign.

Then there’s Trump’s inexplicable surge of support in ultra-progressive Silicon Valley, led by big-tech tycoons such as Elon Musk, Marc Andreessen, David O. Sacks, and more recently WhatsApp founder Jan Koum. Amazon chief Jeff Bezos even put a stop to his paper, the Washington Post, endorsing Harris, while Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg expressed his own admiration for Trump’s defiance after the first attempt on his life in Butler, Pennsylvania.

Trump’s coalition has also appealed to the ‘gym bros’ – those who understand that the vitality of a society depends on the vitality of its people, which in turn comes from physical improvement – and the ‘crunchy conservatives’ – those who are sceptical of the modern health and medical establishment (see lockdown and vaccine mandate sceptics). Robert F. Kennedy Jr joining Trump’s campaign to Make America Healthy Again is a watershed moment in US politics.

And finally, perhaps the most important bloc of voters that Trump speaks to is young males more generally, many of whom have been left behind by a progressive elite that practices affirmative action, imposes gender quotas, and which depicts even normal male behaviour as toxic masculinity.

Bringing together these disparate groups may be due in part to Trump’s high energy and undefinable ‘X-Factor’ as a political candidate, but it would be unwise to ignore the broader potential for political realignment not only in the US but across the West.

Youth in particular are no longer the preserve of the political left. Recent European elections, including the rise of Alternative for Germany in German state elections, was built off the back of a strong youth vote, while older voters continued to vote for the establishment parties. Younger voters are disillusioned with the status quo, but are far from convinced radical socialism is the answer. This is significant.

The outcome of the October 2023 Voice referendum provides a blueprint for an electoral realignment in Australia. Research by the Institute of Public Affairs has highlighted that the Yes case, supported by big business and governmental institutions, was rejected by a broad coalition of religious Australians (74 per cent No), non-university graduates (school-leavers were 62 per cent No, Tafe grads were 71 per cent No), lower income Australians (63 per cent No), one-third of ALP voters, and all male cohorts, including 55 per cent of men aged 18 to 24.

The lesson from the No campaign is that leadership counts. Standing on values and making a positive case for why someone should cast a vote is powerful. Trump similarly provides a message of restoration, acknowledging that things are deeply wrong in the US but that Americans do not need to accept decline and division, but will ‘Drill, baby, drill’, ‘pass massive tax cuts for workers’, (‘no tax on tips’) and ‘restore, very quickly, free speech’ including taking on the ‘censorship cartel’ by withdrawing any government funding for the practice of censorship under the guise of misinformation.

The alternative is to continue following the model of Crisafulli’s Liberal National party in Queensland, which started the campaign with a massive lead over a deeply unpopular ALP incumbent government but ended the campaign in lacklustre fashion off the back of a small target strategy. Although it has won a modest majority, having not campaigned on any issues, it now lacks an electoral mandate to actually do anything, let alone the bold policies the state needs to balance the budget, reform public services, and become the engine of Australia’s growth again.

The lesson for Australian centre-right leaders who seek government for the betterment of our nation is simple: they must continue to build on the broad voting coalition revealed in the Voice referendum.